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This report describes work performed in fiscal year 1979, on a DOE funded 
study entitled "Fire Protection Research For Energy Technology Projects." The 
primary goal of this program is to ensure that fire protection measures for 
Fusion Energy Experiments (FEE) evolve concurrently with the complexity of 
FEE. Ultimately, it is planned that the detailed study of fusion experiments 
will provide an analytical methodology which can be applied to the full range 
of energy technology projects. 
We attempt to achieve this objective by coordinately advancing 3 (three) major 
task areas; (a) determine the fire hazards of current FEE facilities (b) 
assess the ability of accepted fire management strategies to meet and negate 
the hazard, (c) perform unique research into problem areas we have identified 
to provide input into analytical fire growth and damage assessment models. 
Through detailed study of the 2XIIB magnetic fusion facility and the Shiva 
laser fusion facility at LLNL, we have obtained a goul engineering description 
of the state of the art of fusion fire protection. We applied fault tree 
analysis to assess fault modes in the fire protection systems. Concurrently, 
we continue to develop analytical techniques for assessing the fire hazards of 
these facilities. 
Furthermore, we have conducted general surveys, outside of LLNL, of several 
European and two domestic fusion facilities. 
To support our fire growth and hazard analyses, preliminary techniques for 
physical and chemical aerosol analyses have been developed and implemented. 
In addition, preliminary measurements of the dynamics of cable fires in our 
small scale apparatus have been completed. 
Finally, with the aid of Econ, Inc., we have drafted a loss assessment 
protocol which is the ultimate output of this study. 
*This work was performed under the auspices of the U. S. Department of Energy 
by Lawrence Livermore Laboratory under contract No. W-7405-ENG-48. 
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OVERALL LOSS ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY 
Although this study is primarily tailored to aid the Department of Energy in 
its decision making processes, the results and recommendations from the 
completed fire loss assessment for each of these facilities should also 
provide guidance for: 
o Managers of 00E supported national laboratories. 
o Experimental program managers. 
o Fire protection engineers. 
o Plant engineers and architects. 
It is necessary to address both the federal level and individual laboratory 
level because large scale-costly fires in fusion facilities will have a 
distinctly different effect at each level. From OOE's standpoint a long term 
delay in key fusion research facilities could drastically prolong long term 
energy plans. On the other hand, individual laboratories are required to 
adhere to strict time lines and budget constraints in order to remain 
competative in the fusion race. A long and/or costly interruption in their 
research due to fire could mean a loss of technological advantage over other 
labs or, if drastic enough, termination of the program. In many rases, fusion 
research constitutes a large percentage of funding for individual national 
laboratories, and termination of one of these programs would have a pronounced 
effect on the economic well being of the entire laboratory. 
So that the magnitude of risk and consequence is appreciated by all concerned, 
our study will ultimately provide primary alternatives and recommendations of 
hazard mitigation for each level of management. Primarily, our study will 
define the potential hazard and damage of the resultant fire in each 
facility. Concurrently, the reliability and capability of the fire protection 
system to cope with such a fire threat will be assessed. Deficiencies or 
problems in terms of unacceptable reliability, inadequate effectiveness of the 
FPS will be identified from this match and the resultant risk would be 
identified and evaluated for critical spaces. We will attempt to present the 
majority of factors comprising this risk in monetary terms and, also the 
effect of alternative solutions in reducing this risk. Ideally, then, 
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decision makers will be able to determine an acceptable level of safety 
commensurate with their objectives. 
SUMMARY OF PROSRAM METHODOLOGY 
As cited in previous reports 1 > 2 we have been analyzing both the 2X1IE 
magnetic fusion and the Shiva laser fusion experiments. Me are performing 
detailed studies on them so that they may serve as models for assessing the 
fire safety of all DOE supported fusion facilities. It 1s fortunate that the 
2XIIB and Shiva are housed in structures which represent opposite ends of the 
spect-um (fig. 1 illustrates these differences). The 2X1IB resides in a 
building designed for previous applications, and is protected by an existing 
fire protection system. This does not mean that the system is inadequate for 
the experiment but rather that it evolved as the need for greater fire 
protection was recognized. Shiva, on the other hand, has contemporary fire 
protection systems. Its design was included in the construction package of 
the experiment. Most facilities will have fire protection systems that tend 
toward either end of the range or fall somewhere in between. Therefore, we 
should be able to apply the methodology developed for 2XIIB and Shiva to all 
fusion facilities. 
Figure 2 is a general schematic of the protocol we have been using in our 
analyses. Currently, however, we have only been able to progress down to the 
third step in the sequence. For the 2X1IB and Shiva facilities we did the 
following: 
1. Divide the building into zones based on the separations provided by walls 
and also the content and function of the space. Identify "critical" zones 
which would have great economic and/or programmatic impact on the research 
facility if damaged. 
2. Analyze selected zones for fire impact. A flowchart of the logic to 
define fire impact is shown in Fig. 3. The schematic shows that assessment of 
fire impact depends on analyzing the fire hazard and the response of the fire 
protection system. Fire damage and resultant loss will be modified by 
reaction time and effectiveness of fire counter-measures. For the 2X1 IB 
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enclosure we analyzed inherent fire hazards using techniques that consider 
probability of ignition rate of flame spread, and heat release potential of 
construction materials, electrical and thermal insulations, and dielectric 
fluids. Results of this study were incorporated into a fire growth analysis 
based on large-scale fire test data and exponentially increasing heat release 
rates derived from several existing fire growth models. The analysis maps 
development of the fire with time and the status of fire protection system. 
Concurrently, we used qualitative anr* quantitative fault tree analysis to 
assess system design, system hardware, and maintenance policies. The results 
indicate availability and reliability of the system on demand. 
For Shiva we have applied a general qualitative fire hazard analysis 
identifying potential fuel sources found in selected areas. The reason for 
this limited analysis is that we are seeking a wore effective fire growth 
modelling technique to augment this study. However, we have obtained good 
descriptions of Shiva's overall fire protection strategy, and component parts 
of the overall system. 
SHIVA ENCLOSURE 
The plan and transveise section for the Shiva experiment are shown in Figs. 4 
6 5. Passive fire protection for building 391 is provided in the form of fire 
rated barriers and components in a building composed largely of concrete and 
structural steel. 
iu make our study managable, we chose four critical areas of the building to 
evaluate. These spaces were the; laser bay (Rm. 1330), target room (B-306), 
control/diagnostics room (1210) and energy storage area #1 (6-329). Table 1 
summarizes pertinent charactaristics of these rooms. The table indicates 
factors, other than high loss potential, which were of concern such as; 
extreme ceiling heights, lack of barriers (continuous volumes), and areas with 
high ignition probabilities which communicate with critical spaces (energy 
storage area #1). 
Extreme ceiling heights in the laser bay and target room can result in maximum 
automatic, fire detection and suppression response times. Also, large 
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continuous volumes will allow fire to develop unhindered for substantial time 
periods. In contrast, the control/diagnostics room has a 3.05m(10') ceiling 
height and is of fairly conventional volume. But, crucial here is that even 
small fires could cause harm to critical components necessary for Performance 
of the experiments. Moreover, energy storage area #'! in the basement of 
building 391 contains a large number of oil filled capacitors which have 
documented potential for failing and igniting adjacent materials; e.g., large 
diameter power cables, electrical insulation and dielectric spacers. The 
cables interconnect capacitors and penetrate the first floor slab to power the 
multiple laser "arms" of Shiva. Consequently, a fire originating in the 
energy storage area could spread to the laser bay or, possibly worse, 
corrosive combustion sases could be transported through the floor Penetrations 
and cause damage to fragile laser components and instrumentation. 
FUEL LOAD AND VENTILATION SURVEYS 
Table 2 qualitati,ely describes potential fuels and fuel distribution in each 
critical area of Shiva. Fuel quantities in large bays are concentrated in 
widely distributed groupings. These are typically bundles of power^ 
diagnostic, or signal wire. However, the control/diagnostics room, by its 
nature, has much higher fuel loading, relative to its volume. Generally, 
these fuels are ordinary combustibles such as computer printout, ant! a variety 
of plastics (mag tapes, discs, etc.). 
Table 3 is a summary of the total amount of air available from both ambient 
and mechanical sources for both natural and mechanical, fcr the foub areas 
studied. 
Because a detailed quantitative fuel load study has not yet been carried o u t , 
the cellulose and polyvinylchloride (PVC) columns are included to give a 
relative idea of the total amount of these materials which could theoretically 
burn with the available air excluding the mechanical ventilation. The 
necessity for having large volumes in the main experimental areas provides an 
abundance of air to support a great deal of combustion. 
As in 2XIIB, LLNL records show that most ignitions in Shiva have be^ n small 
and were caused by welder's torches or electronic components that shorted 
overloaded or exploded. All these ignitions were detected quickly imd caused 
only very minor damage. 
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FIRE DETECTION SYSTEMS 
The fire detection system is part of a general protective signalling system 
consisting principally of a hardwired circuit with detection devices on one 
end and an emergency control console on the other. This dispatcher attended 
console monitors all fire emergency circuits such as smoke detectors, tamper 
switches, personnel calling by phone, etc. Specifically, fire detection is 
accomplished through one or more of three primary modes in each zone or 
compartment in the Shiva facility. The first mode is automatic detection 
which relies on products of combustion detectors of one type or another 
located throughout the building. Ceiling mounted ionization type detectors 
are located in the majority of the building with the exception of the Laser 
bay, Target room, and clean room areas which are monitored by an "Incipient 
Fire Detection (IFD) System". The following is taken from the Environment One 
Incipient Fire Detector brochure; 
"The 1FD system operates on the Mil son Cloud chamber principle 
which allows the invisible particles produced at the incip'en* 
state of fire to be easily detected by optical technique. The IFD 
is an active, self-monitoring system. Because particles are 
always present in low concentration, it must sense the particle 
concentration once each second and failure to do so will activate 
a malfunction signal. Any increase in the concentration to a 
preset threshold level generates an electrical signal which 
activates an alarm relay." 
The sampling heads for the IFD system pull from the ventilation exhaust ducts 
in each zone once every 15 seconds. The second mode, manual detection 
requires building occupants to pull a wall mounted fire alarm box or call on 
the telephone. 
Lastly, fire detection or rather fire alarm is keyed to sprinkler system 
activation. Flow switches are placed adjacent to each zone OS & Y valve to 
monitor flow to each zone. Therefore, although response would be much slower, 
if for some reason the other two modes failed to pickup fire signs, the 
activation of the sprinkler system acts as a backup alarm device. Obviously, 
another function of monitoring the sprinkler system is to signal occupants and 
Outside screw and yoke. 
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the fire department of an accidental release of the system. The three 
detection modes are present during regular working hours. 
However, during the evening when the building is sparsely populated only two 
automatic modes of detection are operational. 
DESCRIPTION OF SHIVA FIRE SUPPRESSION SYSTEM 
Fire protection for the Shiva experimental facility is provided through both 
active and passive systems. Although sound fire protection design integrates 
these two elements, our study will reference the building's passive f i r e 
protection characteristics only as they impact the performance of the active 
system. 
Figure 6, is a block logic diagram of the system which consists primarily of a 
wet-pipe sprinkler system and a combination of automatic anl manual detection 
capabilities. Ir areas where additional or specialized protection is needed, 
other fire protection components are provided, as shown in Table 4. 
Specifically, a Halon 1301 system is present below the control/diagnostics 
room {1210} floor and a hic't expansion foam system resides in the target room 
with a sprinkler system under the floor. Along with these systems, the 
heating, ventilation and air conditioning (HVAC) is designed to shut down 
(triggered by the incipient detection system) in the event of a fire in the 
laser bay, target bay, and clean room (see Table 4 and Fig. 6). The reason 
for this action is that ceiling to floor air flow of the ventilation system 
would greatly increase the activation time of the sprinklers by inhibiting the 
conection of hot combustion gases to the fusible links. 
WET PIPE SPRINKLER SYSTEM 
The primary fire protection system for Bldg. 391 is a wetpipe sprinkler 
systun, hydraulically designed to reach each major building compartment 
through one of two sprinkler supply risers. Each riser, located in the 
northwest and southwest-corner of the building, supplies independent sprinkler 
systems. The north riser supplies the sprinkler system for the majority of 
the basement. The south riser provides water to energy storage area no 2, the 
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electrical/mechanical room, receiving room, control/diagnostic, laser bay, 
target room, and the balance of the building. 
Sprinkler head (standard 165°F fusible link type) distribution is uniformly 
spaced at approximately eight to eleven feet, depending on the zone. Spacing 
of branch lines varies up to a maximum of forty feet apart in energy storage 
area no. 1 below the laser bay. The dedicated water supply system is more 
than adequate, but in case of a break in this main water supply, reserve water 
capacity and pressure for both risers requires the hookup of an LLNL Fire 
Department pumper truck, its crew, and a reliable backup water source. 
PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS OF SHIVA FIRE PROTECTION STRATEGY 
The following analysis of the Shiva (Bldg. 391) fire protection strategy is an 
expansion of that performed for the preaction system in the 2XII8 facility. 
The analytical technique for Bldg. 391 is the same as that for the 2X1 IB, 
except that Shiva has a contemporary, multi-faceted fire protection system 
which was evaluated as a whole and, currently, some of its component parts. 
Again, the technique involves both qualitative and quantitative evaluation for 
the probability for failure assuming a fire exists. Also, a preliminary 
evaluation was made of the probability of "accidental sprinkler release." 
Fault tree analysis was used to qualitatively and, for selected components, 
quantitatively analyze the reliability/availability of: 
1. the overall fire protection system, 
2. the wetpipe sprinkler system, 
3. Halon 1301 system, 
4. Incipient detector system, 
5. Fire Indicating Unit and Zone Indicating Unit (FIU/ZIU). 
System availability was calculated for the Laser Bay, Target room, Energy 
Storage Area #1, and the Control/Oiagnostics Room. As mentioned previously 
these areas were chosen because they represent "critical" areas in the 
facility. For example, if the control room were to suffer major damage, the 
experiment would be disabled for a costly period of time. Furthermore all the 
Preliminary assessment of criticality performed by the Fire Science Croup. 
fire protection control panels, their emergency power supply, etc. are housed 
in the control room. Thus, access to these critical controls would be denied 
to firefighters. 
The basic steps followed to analyze the Sbiva Fire Protection System (FPS) 
were as follows: 
a. Identify all components In the FPS, both automatic and manual. 
b. Construct a logical block diagram delineating the structure, 
interconnections, and dependency of components. 
C. Perform "top level" fault tree analyses of the system to identify 
critical components and failure modes, 
d. Perform detailed qualitative and/or quantitative analyses on 
identified critical components. 
Relative component and system reliability figures are partially available for 
those areas under study. Existing reliability data for both analyses were 
drawn from the following sources: 
National Fire Protection Association 
U.NL Maintenance crews 
LLNL Fire Department personnel 
Facility P & IE Drawings 
IEEE Standard 500 
United Kingdom Atomic Energy Agency 
Factory Mutual Research Corp. 
A crucial step in the analysis of Shiva's fire manegement system is an 
accurate understanding and resultant description of the relationship between 
the detection and response circuits. This is obtained by snowing the 
interrelationship of each component system in the block diagram. Fig. 6 
resulted from this process. It delineates those areas or zones which have 
additional specialized detection and/or suppression devices (e.g. Halon 1301, 
high expansion foam) and, it shows the oath of components which must activate 
in the event of a fire. By tracing this path we perceive the type and ni'mber 
of components which can potentially fall, during operational demand. From the 
diagram we note that both manual and automatic detection systems must pass 
through the fire/zone indicating units (FIU, ZIU). These units relay any 
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trouble or emergency signal directly to the fire department 24 hour dispatch 
unit. They also supply power to most automatic detection units. Failure of 
the FIU and/or ZIU would prevent emergency signals from reaching the fire 
department,constituting a common mode failure in the overall fire detection 
scheme for the facility. 
On the response side, we can see that the wet-pipe sprinkler system which is 
the primary automatic suppression device for the building is completely 
independent of the FIU/ZIU. Consequently, failure modes for the sprinklers 
involve only components within the sprinkler system (e.g. heads, piping, and 
valving). 
The Halon 1301 system under the control room floor requires the keying of 2 
smoke detectors, one from each cross zone before it will release suppressant. 
However, a 'local alarm will sound before actual Halon release which provides a 
short,period of time to manually override the system. 
During daytime hours the experiment is normally occupied by experimental 
personnel who provide a third mode of detection and possibly suppression. As 
human detectors, probably their most valuable function is to signal alarm by 
either pulling a manual fire alarm box or by calling the fire department on 
the phone. 
Testing and maintenance procedures consist of checking flow to each zone twice 
every quarter. This task is accomplished by opening a drain valve in the 
vicinity of the OS & Y gate valve for the zone. Since the drain valve is 
downstream, this procedure guarantees that the OS & Y*s are open. Typically, 
these valves are locked in position via padlocked chains. However, no check 
is made for flow internal to a zone. Flow restrictions due to corrosion, 
sediment, and foreign substances downstream of the test drain are not 
typically covered by this procedure. 
In this analysis, we assumed the following: 
o Components, subsystems, and similar items can have only two conditional 
modes; they can either operate successfully o p they can fail. No 
operation is partially successful. 
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Basic failures are independent of tach other, 
o A component in the fire protection system can fail in four ways when there 
is a demand. 
(1) It can fail to change state, for example, relay contacts fuse closed. 
(2) It can fail and failure can go undetected (no repair), e.g., a plug 
in the pipe "tine. (Failure probability, P=cyclic failure rate, 
P=l-e , where >. = failure rate.) 
(3) It can faii and failure can be detected; i.e., the component is under 
repair (announced failure^. For example, a sprinkler head leak is 
detected by the flow switch. (P - X T , where T = repair time and 
X • failure rate.) 
(4) It can fail and failure can be detected at the end of scheduled 
inspection; i.e., the component is under repair (unannounced 
failure). For example, the OS & V valve is shut off and the tamper 
switch fails. Two failures are detected at the next inspection. (P = 
6/?, where 8 = the inspection interval.) 
Success in predicting the probability of a specific occurrence depends on how 
accurately the system is represented in a fault tree, how detailed the tree 
is, and how valid one's mathematical expression and probabilities are. Table 
5 summarizes the results of both qualitative and quantitative analyses of the 
four critical spaces. The qualitative analysis which was supported by the 
FTAP3 computer code, requires r.o numerical or probabilistic data input. 
Results of this analysis provide insight into the logical structure, design, 
and maintenance of the fire management system in relation to scenarios for 
system failure. The quantitative analysis, which was performed through the 
use of the computer code IMPORTANCE1*, estimates system failure probability 
(vulnerability) by quantifying and ranking potential system failure modes. 
This is accomplished by the logical manipulation of component failure rates. 
In Table 5 the quantitative values show an overall failure probability of fire 
protection systems in each space; more specifically, the numerical magnitude 
represents the probability that at least one of the automatic detection 
devices will react to a fire. Only the automatic devices were considered in 
the analyses because we felt that critical time for a fire to occur would be 
in the evening when the building is sparsely populated. This perception is 
reflected in the two columns entitled "Minimum Failures' of Subsystems," which 
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lists minimum potential failure modes for both daytime and night operation; 
the absence of occupants accounts for the reduction in redundancy from 3 to 2. 
i 
Note that the availability (1-unavaliability) figures are high (98.7 - 99.52} 
in all spaces. High probability of success can be attributed to redundancy of 
fire protection in these spaces. The probability of all systems failing 
simultaneously is very low. Because the sprinklers are independent of the 
other systems they are essentially eliminated as potential common mode failure 
points in these spaces. 
Table 6 summarizes the results of the analyses of the different fire 
protection elements in the Shiva building. Current, quantitative availability 
data were generated only for the FIU/ZIU unit and the wetpipe sprinkler 
system. The evaluation of the remaining components has been limited to a 
qualitative look, primarily due to the lack of applicable failure data and 
also restriction of available time. 
Detailed breakdowns for the minimal cutsets has not yet been completed, but 
the range of these sets based on the number cf basic events contained for each 
subsystem has been listed. For examp'.j, the range for the Halon 1301 system 
of l to 8 means that it had min cutsets containing up to a maximum of 8 
failure events and a minimum of 1 event to compromise the system. Notice the 
high availability of the FIU/ZIU units which are the potential common mode 
failure points for a majority of the detection measures. However, these units 
contain a large number of possible single point failures, any one of which 
could cause the units to fail; preventing the operation of several detection 
subsystems. 
The wetpipe sprinkler system has a high availability probability, which is 
logical considering the components that comprise the system. Basically, these 
elements are piping, joints, sprinkler heads, and valving which all have low 
probabilities of failure. As in the previous analysis (2XIIB facility} 1/ 2 a 
model of the sprinkler system was used consisting of a square grid with a 
sprinkler head at each of the four corners. Failure of the system requires 
the failure of all four sprinkler heads in response to a fire. 
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A detailed description of the preaction sprinkler system in the 2XIIB facility 
was presented previously in references 1 and 2. Figure 7 illustrates the 
components and logic specific to drypipe preaction systems and wetpipe 
systems. Tiie diagrams indicate that the preaction system in 2XIIB Is more 
complex than the wetpipe system. Thus we would expect wetpipe systems to be 
more reliable than drypipe systems, so long as; maintenance periods, skill of 
maintenance personnel, and availability of water are equal. 
To fail Shiva's wetpipe system one of the following mast occur; 
o Failure of 4 out of 4 sprinkler heads, 
o failure of piping 
o failure of valving 
However, in addition to the above wetpipe failure modes, the drypipe preaction 
system is subject to failures of: 
o smoke detectors 
o pressure switches 
o and the FIU/ZIU electrical supervisory circuit. 
All of which contributed significantly to drypipe sprinkler system failure. 
Conversely, we would expect that the wetpipe sprinkler system brings with it a 
higher probability of accidental release. 
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QUANTITATIVE RESULTS" 
Probability of sprinklers system failure (to activate as required) was 
calculated on a per demand basis over a fifteen year period. Probability of 
inadvertant water release was estimated on a per year basis. Results of the 
two analyses indicates probability of success for the two systems: 
System Type Probability Estimates 
Ability to Operate Accidental 
When Required Release 
Wet Pipe Sprinkler 98X 10" 5 
System (Shiva) 
Drypipe/Preaction 82SC 10-5 
System (2X1 IB) 
The addition of the FIU/ZIU circuit and the detectors provides a substantial 
decrease In the probability of an accidental release. However, the direct 
consequence of adding these components is an increase in failure modes and, 
therefore, a much lower probability of success per demand (82% V.S. 98%). 
To varify our results, we collected "successful operation" of sprinkler system 
statistics accumulated in the commercial sector by comparing data from: 
o National Fire Protection Association 
o Factory Mutual 
o Australia 
o United Kim, 
This comparison is shown in Table 7, which indicates that our analytical 
results are well within the range of actual historical experience. Of course, 
as in any body of statistics, we must use caution in interpreting what 
"satisfactory performance" means from each data source. The Australian data, 
which includes extinguishment by all means is a prime example at 99.8% 
satisfactory performance. Nevertheless, in rough terms the fault tree results 
agree very well with the existing statistics. Furthermore, our calculated 
-5 estimate of (10 ) for accidental water release was within an order of 
-14-
magnitude of ten years of the Factory Mutual System loss data* for an 
estimated 48 million sprinklers. These historical statistics front 1967-1976 
which covered premature operation due to all causes (i.e., overheating, 
freezing, mechanical injury, corrosion, excess pressure, etc.) yielded a 
probability of release of 1.6 X 10* . It appears that premature release of 
water, even for a wetpipe system, is a very low probability event, since the 
preaction system is designed to prevent accidental releases, its Probability 
is even lower than a traditional wetpipe. However, the trade-off with regards 
to system operation upon demand is not worth the minimal increase in safety 
from accidental releases. 
SURVEYS OH NON-LLNL FUSION FACILITIES 
Currently, work is continuing on a detailed survey protocol for off site 
fusion facilties. However, the following outline describes our preliminary 
analysis (using our preliminary survey protocol) of facilities that members of 
th° Fire Science Group visited in the past year. 4 
A- SANDIA EBFF 
Fire Hazard: Marx generators, capacitors, large quantities of cable 
insulation and dielectric fluid in open reservoir, frequent fluid 
transfer, boiler room close to dielectric reservoir and fire main. 
Ventilation: HVAC. 
Detection/Suppression: Smoke detectors in screen room, central water-flow 
alarm, wet-pipe system for large fires reliability of 95%/demahd, high bay 
40 ft ceiling; small fire could cause damage before sprinkler ^lann is 
activated. 
Effectiveness: Aerosol explosion could remove wet-pipe system^ unknown 
potential of low-intensity fire. 
Modifiers: AFFF corrosion potential, maintenance errors (Marx generator 
service), weather factors could slow Fire Department response from 
Kirtland A.F.B.. 
B PRINCETON TTTB 
Fire Hazard: High energies, thermal and cable insulation, electric arcs. 
Ventilation: HVAC. 
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Detection/Suppression: Local and central alarm, preaction dry-pipe 
sprinklers, smoke detectors, freon type extinguishers in specific and 
sensitive areas, 10 min Fire Department response. 
Reliability: Preaction sprinklers 85%/demand. 
Effectiveness: Poor location of detectors and sprinkler heads could lead 
to large loss. Fire Department at Princeton Township is several miles 
away. 
Modifiers: Weather/traffic could slow Fire Department. 
C. MAX PLANK IPP: Tokamak and Stellerators, Iodine lasers. 
Fire Hazards: Cable and thermal insulations, trash in storage areas. 
Ventilation: HVAC. 
OetectIon/Suppress ion: Local alarm, few hose hookups, 10-15 min Garshing 
Fire Department response. Modifiers: Late detection, traffic, weather, 
I,n plant fire brigade, safety personnel on site 24 hrs/day. 
D. CEN-G TOKAMAK: Plasma studies. 
Fire Hazards: Cable and thermal -nsulation. 
Ventilation: Windows. 
Detection/Suppression: Thermal detectors, dry chemicals on carts, five 
men on site. 
Modifiers: Weather, multiple fires, late detection and inadequate 
suppression. 
c. CULHAM HFE Site of Joint European Tokamak (JET): 
Fire Hazards: Cable and thermal insulation and many experiments. 
Ventilation: Melt-out windows. 
D etect i on/Suppress ion: Eight-man patrol, minimal automatic detection, 
Vocal alarm, manual standpipes. 
Modifiers: Fire Department remote from site. Obscuration of fire site in 
large fusion experimental area. There appears to be minimal interaction 
between CULHAM and JET personnel. 
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This tabulation indicates that: 
o The combustible material load, and consequently the fire risk parameters, 
at early times are quite similar for all systems (E-beam open oil 
reservoirs excepted), 
o European fire protection systems rely primarily on early warning from fire 
detectors and human Interaction rather than automatic extinguishing 
systems. 
o Areas without dedicated fire-f1ghting personnel and equipment could suffer 
extensive property loss should the resident automatic extinguishing system 
fail, 
o The effect of unique features of experiments and experimental enclosures 
can be identified but not quantified at this stage of the analysis. 
o No human error modifiers are listed because of our inability to logically 
place such factors in our analysis. 
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CABLE EXPERIMENTS 
Our fire hazard surveys have identified two generic cable jacket materials 
which represent the majority of those used for power transport in fusion 
experiments at LLNL; Polyvinyl chloride (PVC) and neoprene. The former is 
typically RG 220 A/U and the latter 4/0 welding cable. However, since the 
actual cablos are 29 mm (1-1/8") and 19 mm (3/4") in diameter respectively, a 
smaller designation cable was used for the small-scale box experiments. For 
the RG 220 A/U, Times Wire RG 11 A/U was substituted and 6 AWS neoprene 
welding cable was substituted for the 4/0; both of these cables having an O.D. 
of around 10 mm (3/8"), (see cross sections, Fig. 8). These smaller size 
cables are identical to the actual ones, but their scale made them more valid 
for the fire exposure produced by the burner. 
SMAIL-SCALE CABLE FIRE EXPERIMENTS 
In order to obtain necessary data for our fire growth analysis we performed 
small-scale fire experiments on representative power cables used in fusion 
facilities. The primary objective of this portion of the study is to obtain 
fire performance data which are not currently found in the literature or at 
other experimental labs. These primary fire performance characteristics 
include: 
o time to ignition 
o minimum ignition energy 
o rate of flamespread 
o total flamespread 
o burning rate (mass loss and 0 2 consumption) 
o volume and density of combustion products 
o corrosive effects of combustion products. 
The experiments described below are preliminary and exploratory tests to give 
us insights for the design of large-scale cable fire experiments. Ultimately, 
data from the large-scale tests will provide some of the essential factors for 
a predictive fire growth analysis for fusion facilities. In addition, we will 
attempt to correlate our small and large-scale results which, hopefully, will 
alleviate the need to perform an excessive number of large-scale tests. i 
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DESCRIPTION OF EXPERIMENTAL SET-UP 
The small-scale fire test facility shown in Fig. 9 has an overall volume of 
0.42 m 3 (15 ft 3) and is equipped with T52 mm (6") diameter ventilation 
ducts that extend about 1.8 m (6 1) from both sides; air can either be forced 
or drawn through the box. The principle parameters which are monitored and 
recorded include airflow, optical density, enclosure pressure, fuel mass loss, 
temperatures, and flame radiation. Combustion gas samples are drawn from a 
point near the exhaust duct and their pH monitored (the Appendix). Figure 9 
shows the location of the various sensing devices in and on the box along with 
the test soecimen and gas burner. The pipe burner shown in Fig. 10 is 12.7 mm 
(1/2") diameter pipe with 1.6 mm (1/16") holes drilled on a 6.4 tint (1/4") 
grid. Its output is a premixed propane/air flame with an energy output of 
approximately 1530 J/S (90 BTU/min) which giviss a total 5-minute run of 459 KJ. 
BASELINE CALIBRATION RUNS 
To determine the contribution of each type of cable to fire growth, the fire 
exposure produced by the burner alone was characterized via a number of 
calibration tests performed on a noncombustible cement asbestos board blank 
(Fig. 11). Radiometers to measure incident heat flux from the flame were 
placed near the base and top of the blank and also in the door of the box 
directly opposite the specimen. In addition, thermocouples were placed near 
each radiometer, at the center of the blank, and at locations throughout the 
box as shown previously. Protocol for this experimental series was to 
systematically run the burner at various gas/air ratios, monitor and record 
all data points, repeat, and select the fire exposure based on the following 
criteria: 
a) Incident radiant heat flux of flame. 
We were looking for an incident heat flux from the flame of between 2 three and four watts/cm . This choice was based on discussions with 
personnel from the National Bureau of Standards who recommend 2 approximately three watts/cm as the minimum ignition flux in their 
compartment tests. It is also a common range for other small-scale fire 
tests. 
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b) Flame height and area. 
In order to determine the contribution to flame spread of the cable 
specimens the flame had to be sufficiently short. But it also had to have 
enough height and breadth to expose a fairly realistic area to ensure 
pyrolysis of combustible gases, etc. 
c) Temperatures incident on the blank and air temperatures in the box. 
We needed an ignition flame with a heat output that didn't mask the 
temperature contribution of the burning cable specimens. 
d) Oxygen depletion. 
A primary reason for specifying a premixed flame was to minimize the 0* 
consumption in the box by the ignition source, which would allow us to monitor 
the oxygen consumption of the cable samples. 
After performing a large number of these calibration runs we selected a 
baseline exposure flame with the following characteristics: 
a. Incident heat flux 3.25 watts/cm , 
b. flame temperature 500° - 600%, 
c. flame height 125 mm (5"), 
d. 0, deletion - no effect, 
e. energy output 1530 J/S (90 BTU/min). 
A composite plot of most of these parameters is shown in Fig. 12. 
Figure 10 is a schematic of the specimen holder which, if completely 
2 2 filled, would contain a total surface area of 0.59 m (91" ). However, to 
enhance flame spread, we left a one cable diameter space between each fuel 
element. This configuration acconmodated 8-10 cables per sample which were 
restrained at both ends by the specimen holder. 
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To identify the contribution of each of the component parts of the PVC 
cable, we tested the individual parts as well as the entire cable. Therefore, 
at least three samples of each of the following cable specimens were tested: 
o PVC cable (whole) 
o Neoprene cable (whole) 
o PVC jacket alone 
o Polyethylene insulation with copper conductor 
TEST PROCEDURE. 
Initially, fresh air is pulled through the box at a minimal rate and a 
scan of ambient conditions is taken. The burner is ignited, set to prescribed 
flowrates, and the specimen is exposed for a maximum time of five minutes. At 
predetermined times, the burner is shut off to ascertain if the cable 
continues to burn without the ignition flame. Figures 13 through 15 are 
examples of the data plots and a summary of results is presented in Table 8. 
Ignition exposures from 2-5 min were used to determine the minimum ignition 
time for the samples. Polyethylene sustains burning after a two-minute 
exposure wtrle the complete PVC cable takes a four-minute exposure to sustain 
flame. The times to ignition were determined through visual observation and 
are, therefore, fairly subjective. The load cell to monitor dynamic mass loss 
lacked the sensitivity to pick up the very slight losses of the jacketing 
material. However, we were able to effectively measure the change in pH and 
oxygen depletion. 
Results summarized in Table 8 show that PVC cable and jacket material rapidly 
produce acidic combustion products, whereas, burning neoprene insulated cable 
appears to produce fairly neutral gases (in terms of pH). We also tested the 
response of uncoated polyethylene dielectric for the PVC coated RG11 A/U 
cable. For times to sustained ignition, polyethylene dielectric required the 
least amount of time at 2:00 minutes; the PVC cable required 4:00 min of flame 
exposure, but, neither the PVC jacket material alone nor neoprene cable 
sustained burning after 5 min of exposure to the ignitor. The oxygen 
depletion data tends to substantiate the above showing low oxygen percentages 
for polyethylene and the PVC cable. Maximum temperatures at the mid-height of 
the sample and various locations in the box reinforce this to a lesser degree. 
-21-
In summary, these preliminary measurements of the dynamics of cable fires have 
yielded the following conclusions: 
, o PVC insulated cables produce large quantities of acid ion gases, and 
neoprene does not, under the conditions of these tests. 
o Acid ion gases from PVC has significant, demonstrated corrosive 
effect on sensitive computer electronics such as tape read/write 
heads. Also, aerosol adhesion to laser optics indicates severe 
cleaning problems and ccrosion potential. 
o The polyethylene dielectric promotes the pyrolysis of the PVC jacket 
material. 
(Note: A detailed report on the chemical analysis of the combusu on gases 
frqm these experiences is included in the Appendix.) 
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION 
Although the small-scale box apparatus lacks sensitivity in a number of 
areas, it does differentiate trends in the fire performance of PVC cable, 
neoprene cable, PVC jacketing, and polyethylene insulation. As mentioned 
previously, the dynamic mass loss instrumentation could not accurately monitor 
the minute losses of the burning polymeric cable material. Similarly, times 
to ignition, light obscuration, rate of flame spread, and extent of flame were 
too similar to discriminate between, the various samples. 
However, distinguishable data were obtained for pH of combustion gases, 
time to sustained ignition, oxygen depletion, and temperatures in various 
locations in the box. 
FUTURE WORK 
Work in the next quarter has been initiated to corroborate, supplement, 
and expand the data acquired from the small-scale box experiments. We have 
contracted with SRI, International to perform a series of heat release rate 
(HRR) calorimeter tests on PVC and neoprene cables. In addition, we are 
presently validating an "Ease of Ignition" test apparatus which was developed 
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at the National Bureau of Standards- Presently, we are not aware of any 
existing data which gives the HRR of these cables in their composite form, nor 
is there information pertafning to relative ease of ignition. Both of these 
characterisitcs are very significant for determining the potential fire 
performance of various cable types and also as necessary inputs into our 
analytical fire growth methodology. This first-hand information will 
hopefully help us to accelerate our efforts in our fire growth predictions. 
Much of this experimental work should be completed in the next quarter. 
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE- '-"W 
Table 9 lists the overall program objectives for this project. Currently, we 
have used system safety techniques (primarily fault tree analysis) to <jefine 
the state of the art of fire protection as applied to the fusion energy 
experiments we have studied to date (B). Moreover, we have been able to 
perform preliminary assessments of their fault modes (C). However, our 
analyses have not considered human error due to the complexity and difficulty 
in obtaining meaningful reliability data. It is unrealistic, considering the 
goals of this program, to attempt to quantify and include human factors into 
our evaluations and recommendations for fire protection since we primarily 
address in-place equipment and materials which DOE can effectively modify to 
improve the fire safety of its facilities. Me have been quite encouraged oy 
the agreement between data based on historical experience and our parametric 
analysis. It is a good indication that our analytical technique and 
reliability statistics are reasonable. More importantly, however, are the 
results which compare the availability of fire protection systems, i.e., 
because the operation of the dry-pipe preaction system is totally dependent on 
the FIU/ZIU circuits, its chance for failure upon demand is approximately ten 
times {2% V.S. 18%) that of the wetpipe system. Also, our calculated value of 
10 per year for accidental sprinkler release from tf»e dry pipe system as 
compared to 10" for industrial experience of wetpipe systems indicates that 
very little advantage is gained by sacrificing a factor of nine in 
reliability. This is the kind of information the DOE needs to make rational 
decisions on cost effective solutions in protecting their facilities. 
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In the next fiscal year, we will finalize the Shiva fire protection study and 
continue to refine the overall fire risk assessment methodology. This goal 
should be met through the continuation of the following tasks (Table 9). 
0. Develop techniques for defining fire hazards of FEE. 
We are currently working on more appropriate fire growth models for 
experimental fusion facilities. Contemporary fire growth analysis is 
primarily centered on residential fire problems. Cur past efforts to apply 
promising theories to the large scale fusion energy experiments, results in a 
family of temporal fire growth parameters which vary by 100% in both time and 
intensity. This range of variability is unacceptable. Therefore, in the next 
fiscal year we will be studying other candidate analysis techniques Which will 
hopefully yield a more accurate description of fire growth in these spaces. 
E. Couple hazards analysis with fire protection systems analysis for LLNL 
facilties. 
This phase of the program represents a very critical step in the overall 
program because it will ultimately predict the degree of damage for each of 
the facilities. In general terms, this task requires not only an accurate 
picture of the rate and extent of fire growth, but also the response of the 
fire protection system in terms of reliability and effectiveness. Logically, 
the amount of damage and the resultant loss will be dependent on the 
effectiveness and reliability of the fire countermeasures. 
(F,G.) Develop survey protocol for FEE's at non-LLNL facilities and validate. 
With the aid of Econ, Inc., we have been drafting a questionnaire, based on 
our studies here at LLNL, for off-site FEE's. From answers to the survey in 
its final form we should be able to perform an analysis of fire protection 
capabilities of these facilities utilizing the methodology we have developed 
through our studies here. 
In FY'80 we will have a finalized version of the primary parts of this 
questionnaire and will begin to distribute it to selected FEE facilities. 
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H. Conduct research to solve identified problems. 
Presently, we have completed preliminary small scale cable burns and obtained 
gross data points for common cable types found in LLNL fusion experiments. 
However, this effort was exploratory in context and conducted to give us an 
indication of what further research was necessary to give us the information 
necessary to refine our fire growth analysis. As mentioned previously, we 
will be conducting large scale heat release rate calorimeter tests at SRI, 
International on the cables we have identified, thus far, as representative 
FEE types in the next fiscal year. In addition, we will be performing "Ease 
of Ignition" tests on the same cables here at LLNL, 
Since these tests will be performed on the cables in their composite f<mi, a 
realistic set of data under each of the imposed test conditions should 
result. This information will help us understand more about the dynamics of 
cable fires. These data can be applied to: refine our fire growth analysis 
inputs as well as the ratf of smoke aerosol production and the potential for 
corrosive attack on facility equipment. 
In addition to these important inputs, chemical analysis of the combustion 
gases will continue for corrosive components. A complete report of the FY 79 
effort in this area is included in the Appendix. This work will expand into 
the analysis of combustion products developed from the burning of other 
potential fuels common to fusion facilities, e.g. computer tape and cassettes. 
I. PHYSICAL SMOKE ANALYSIS 
We will continue with the smoke particle work, for which we have been 
developing a dilution system. This research will hopefully give us more 
quantitative information relating to the activation of smoke detection units, 
and to the transport of smoke aerosols throughout the facilities of concern. 
J. FULL SCALE TESTS 
We intend to scale up our experiments to perform large scale cable burns to 
obtain more realistic data on the dynamics of burning cables. Althor.•• small 
scale tests are economical and very efficient they can rarely represent actual 
fire conditions. Ideally, deficiencies in small scale test results would 
dictate the design of large scale experiments and ultimately we would like to 
be able to correlate the results from both scales. 
-25-
REFERENCES 
Norman J. Alvares and Harry K. Hasegawa, "Fire Hazard Analysis for Fusion 
Energy Experiments," Fire Safety Journal, 191-211 (1979). 
2 
Geronimo P. Naanep, Howard E. Lambert, Harry K. Hasegawa, "Fire Potection 
Study of the 2X1IB Mirror Fusion Facility," IEEE Journal, (1979). 
3 
R. Millie, FTAP: Computer-aided fault-tree analysis, ORC 78-14, 
University of California, Berkeley, California. 
4 H.L. Lambert, IMPORTANCE: The IMPORTANCE computer code, Lawrence 
Livermore National Laboratory, Report UCRL-79269, 1977. 
5 "1967-1976 Sprinkler Leakage Losses (Heads Opened)," FMEC-ISD-LF1335, 25 
October 1977. 
Trip report to DOE, European fact finding visit to international fusion 
energy experiments, N.J. Alvares, 1979. 
-26-
LIST OF FIGURES 
1 Spectrum of fusion energy facilities characteristics. 
2 General schematic of research protocol. 
3 Flowchart of fire impact. 
4 Plan view SHIVA building. 
5 Transverse section SHIVA building. 
6 Overall schematic of SHIVA fire protection system. 
7 Schematic of wetpipe and drypipe sprinkler systems. 
8 Cross-section view of cables. 
9 Small scale fire test facility. 
10 Pipe burner and schematic of specimen holder. 
11 Cement/asbestos board calibration panel. 
12 Composite plot of calibration test results. 
13 Temperature of samples. 
14 Oxygen depletion blot. 

















INCLUDED IN DESIGN 
PACKAGE. 
FIRE RATED BARRIERS 






GENERAL FLOW OF SYSTEMS APPROACH 
fif ftsir xa< 
CRITERIA: 
USE BUILDIHG PASSIVE FIRE 
PROTECTION AS A GUIDE. 
DIVIDE BLDG. INTO 
ZONES, 
CRITERIA; 
USE CAPITAL LOSS AND j 
1 PROGRAMMATIC DELAY AS A GUIDE. \ \ 
TSSESS SELECTED 
ZONES FOR FIRE 
IMPACT. 
CRITERIA: 
LLL AND DOE GUIDELINES ' 
AND FIRE PROTECTION 
2 ASSESSMENT ON A ZqNE BY ZONE BASIS. 





AREAS AND COST 
3 EFFECTIVE CHANGES IN FP ACTIVITIES 
TO BRING COSTS IN 
LINE. 
IDENTIFY COST EFFECT- 1 
rve suurnow TO r«r- r 
CREASE FP ACTIVITIES 1 



















SHELF 8 — 9 
(UNDER FLOOR) 




OP ROOM 1210 
SYMBOLS 
*MQ« DETECTOR (IONIZATION TVFEl 
© 'HeiMCNT DETECTOR 
f^now SWITCH 
® "MOTE INDICATINB LAHFI,UHKRFLOOR DETECTORS 
©OSFCY VALVE (OUTSIDE ECRE* AND YOKE VALVE) 
INSPECTOR'S TEST 
^ J MANUAL FULL STATION 
3 JUHCTIOH SOX (LEASE LINE CONNECTION FOR RA. SYSTEM) 
MAUN PULL STATION 
•ELECTON SWITCH,HALON SYSTEM I Y M I I 
l**'"1 FINE ALARV CONTROL PANEL (Fltfi >IU,IPI|SRF> 
P " _l BAT TENT <FOR F,A. SYSTEM) 
f i ^ H REMOTE ANNUNOIATOR 
POWER FAN EL 
INCIPIENT FIRE DETECTOR CONTROL FAN EL 
" * I FOAM AtKENATON REMOTE 00NTAOL FA MEL 
(F.Q.J FOAM IEKENATOR 
HIGH ENERGY LASER BUILDING 391 
SECTION VIEW B 
PIPE C O L U M N ^ 








/ J * 
7?—1—i" 
IS .6 ENERGY STORAGE 
. . * I I ' 
16'6" 
TYPICAL 
COLUMN « AREA NO.110329) 
J L _ 
SUSP. ACOUSTIC 
T ILE CEILING 
...» trrp'KH. "V 50I— 
?̂V 
IBS 
* « 4 1 ' 8 " - t" 
A-CLEAN LABORATORY 1226 E-CORRIDOR 1204 
B-OFFICE 1220 F-STAIR NO. 2 
C—CONTROL AND DIASNOSTICS 1210 G-ENERGY STORAGE AREA 
D-V.S.TOR AREA .20 . NO. 3 B 206 
Fig. 5 
T ^ : ' T W * J P » . 
COORDINATED ZONE X_ 
RESPONSE ~" 
FIRE DETECTION FOR 
FIGURE —BUILDING 391 FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM 






















BLOCK DIAGRAM OF 2X2B's ORY-PIPE-PREACTION 
SPRINKLER SYSTEM 
BLOCK DIAGRAM OF SHIVA WET PIPE 
SPRINKLER SYSTEM 
F i g . 7 
CABLE TYPES TESTED 
(CROSS SECTIONS) 
PVC COVER 4I"0.D. 
•QR AIDED COPPER SHIELD 
•POLYETHYLENE .28" 
PVC CABLE R6 II A/U 
PVC COVER 1.13" O.D. 
BRAIDED COPPER SHIELD 
POLYETHYLENE .63" 
PVC CABLE R6 220 A/U 














d 5.5" • • " t » » 2 • » V 1/16" 01AM. HOLES \ _ 
1/4" GRID 1/2" PIPE 
PIPE BURNER 
5.5" 16.5" 










3 25 i ! < 
i 












CALIBRATION BOARD SIDE VIEU 
FIG. 11 
- 3 8 -
*zm 
CRLIBRRTION CK-3 M-NOV-79 6SS SEC DURATION 
D CH « O.D> EXHRUST O CH « PRESS. TOP OF BOX A CH 4S PRESS HID OF BOX + CH 52 1MLET FLOW X CH 66 BHOIOHETEB 1H BOX • CH 67 flHQIO. TOP OF M L BO. ' pfr 69'BAifo: BOTTOM" OF CflL ft. 




























K 10 iPQLYETHYLENE _ • * - - L _ 
s-PVC : 




PH OF COMBUSTION GASES 
W§ « 8 200 250 
SECONDS 
Fig. 15 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table T Characteristics of critical spaces in SHIVA. 
Table 2 SHIVA potential fuel loads. 
Table 3 Ventilation in SHIVA critical spaces. 
Table 4 Specific SHIVA fire protection components. 
Table 5 SHIVA Fire Protection System FTA results for specific zones. 
Table 6 Preliminary fault tree analysis results for SHIVA fire protection 
components. 
Table 7 Comparison of analytical results to historical results. 
Table 8 Results of small scale fire test facility tests. 
Table 9 Listing of program objectives. 
-43-
Table 1 Characteristics of Critical Spaces in SHIVA 
Critical Space Ceiling Height Volume Fire Hazard Comments 






Extreme sensitivity of 
optics and electronics 
to fire products. High 
ceilings will slow 
automatic suppression. 
Low fuel load. 






Lack of barriers allows 
fire growth. High 
ceilings will slow 
automatic suppression. 










Heart of experiment and 
also fire protection 











floor penetrations to 
Laser Bay. Most 
probable area for 
ignitions. 
-44-
Table 2. LLNL SHIVA/NOVA EXPERIMENT 
Potential Fuel Loads 
Critical Zones Fuel Identification Geometric Distribution Critical Components 
Max Delay and (in or adjacent zone) Of Pyrolysing Fuel in Zone Susceptible 
Economic Loss to Damage 
Laser Bay (L) Cables 
1) Insulation PVC 
2) Dielectric 
3) Neoprene Insulation 
acrylic and polyethylene 






Amplifiers and other 
Electronic, solid 
state equipment. 
Target Bay (T) Same as above Widely distributed 
groupings. 
Same as above 











Capacitor oil in 
individual 
capacitors, cabling. 
More or less uniform In zone-capacitors 
capacitors are stacked in adjacent zone above 
in steel shelves from -optical equipment (see 
ceiling to floor. laser bay). 
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(303,680 FT 3) 
7134 M 3 
(251,954 FT 3) 
550 M 3 
(19,380 FT 3) 
1557 M 3 







1986 Kg. 1675 
1648 Kg. 1388 
127 Kg. 107 
360 Kg. 303 
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Table 4 Shiva building 391 fire protection components. 
Applicable Tire Protection Subsystems 
SHIVA EXPERIMENT BUILDING OETECTORS HV & AC HALON HIGH EX. BUILDING AREA ZONE SPRKL POC MAN . ALARM CONTROL 1301 FOAM DESCRIPTION DESIGNATION SYS. 
I. BASEMENT 
A. MECH./ELECT. 
EQUIP. ROOM 1 X X X 8. ENERGV STORAGE AREA NO. 2 2 X X X C. ENERGV STORAGE 
AREA NO. 1 3,4 X X X E. TARGET BAY 
(BELOW RAISED FLR) 5 X X 
x F. ENERGY STORAGE AREA NO. 3 6 X X X 
II. FIRST FLOOR 
A. GEN. SUPPORT 
AREA 1 7 X X x B. GEN. SUPPORT 





11 X X X 
F. EXP. CONTROL M. !& X X x X X AND CLEAN DRESS 
PENETRATION 
G. 1ST AND 2ND FLOOR 
GALLERY AND 
ENTRANCE 
12B X X X 
F. TARGET BAY (ABOVE 
RAISED FLOOR) 
5 X X X X X 
Table 5. SHIVA FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM FTA RESULTS FOR SPECIFIC ZONES. 
Minimum No. of Subsystem Failures 
System Area FPS Zone Unavailability For Entire FPS "No Response" Outcome 
(Per Demand) 6 A.M.-12 P.M. 12 P.M.-6 A.M. 
LASER BAY (Spkl . , IFD, 5.3 X 10" 3 
Man. detect 6 response, 
venti lat ion) 
(Zones 13,14) 
TARGET BAY (Spkl . , IFD, 5.9 X 10" 3 
High ex-foam, man. 
detection & response, 
venti lation) 
(Zones 5,15) 
CAPACITOR BANKS 1.3 X 10" z 
(Sprinkler, POC, man. 
detect. & response) 
(Zones 3,4) 
CONTROL ROOM 5.5 X 10" 3 
(Sprinkler, POC, man. 
detect. & response, 
Ha Ion 1301) 
(Zones 17,18,19) 
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Table 6 Preliminary fault tree analysis results for SHIVA fire protection components. 





Range of failures (F) of 
subsystem components for 
a "subsystem failure" 
Halon 1301 








1 < F < 8 for the most part 
these are supervised. 
K F s S 2 same as above. 
K F supervised by fire 
department. 
K F supervised by in-line 
pressure switches. 
Table 7 Comparison of analytical results to historical results. 
With NFPA and Factory Mutual Statistics 
Data Source Period No. of Fires % Satisfactory FTA 
NFPA 1924-1969 81,245 96.2 
AUSTRALIAN DATA - - 99.8 
UNITED KINGDOM - - 91.4 
FACTORY MUTUAL 
Wet Pipe 1970-1977 2,442 91.5 
Dry Pipe 757 86.0 




PVC CABLE P.E. INSULATION PVC JACKET 
NEOPRENE 
CABLE 
TIME TO IGNITION 15-20 sec. 30-35 sec. 10-15 sec. 20 sec. 
8URNING ( SELF-
SUSTAINING ) S 4 min. & 2 min. DID NOT AFTER 5_min. 
DID NOT AFTER 
5.min. 
MAX. FLAME HEIGHT 10" 10" 10" 10" 
COMBUSTION GASES + PRESSURE + PRESSURE + PRESSURE NEUTRAL 
°2 DOWN TO 1 M 12% 19* 19% 
PH 2 7 2 4 
(FAST DROP) (FAST DROP) (SLOW SkUP) 
BURNER OUTPUT-87 BTU/MIN. (1531 J/S) 
PREMIXED PROPANE /AIR 
5 MIN."435 BTU. 
• 4 tyQK 
Table 8 Results of small scale fire test facility tests. 
Table 9 Proqram Objectives 
FAULT TREE ANALYSIS 
FIRE GROWTH ANALYSIS 
A. Major goal: Parallel development of fire 
safety with fusion energy technology. 
B. Define the Engineering performance of state 
of the art of fire protection as applied to 
fusion energy experiments. 
C. Develop rational methods of assessing fault 
modes in fire protection systems. 
0. Develop techniques for defining fire 
hazards of fee. 
E. Couple hazards analysis with fire 
protection systems analysis for LLNL 
facilities. 
Develop survey protocol for fee's at 
non-LLNL facilities and validate. 
FIRE SAFETY EVALUATION G. Analyze survey results and evaluate fire safety of each installation. 





THERMAL DEGRADATION OF WIRE AND CABLE INSULATIONS 
A.E. Lipska and M.K Jeffries 
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory 
Livermore, California 94550 
UCRL-849K, August 15, 198Q 
Summary 
We investigated the thermal degradation of wire and cable inflations to 
determine the initial temperatures at which corrosive products are formed and 
the effect of different heating rates on their formation. Specifically we 
studied polyvinyl chloride (PVC) insulation for signal wire, PVC^polyethylene 
combination insulation and neoprene insulation for high-voltage cable, and 
Teflon insulation .for cross-connect wire. Experimentation was preceded by a 
thorough literature search for information on oxidative and nonoxidative 
pyrolysis of these insulations and their basic polymers. 
For a better understanding of the mode of decomposition of t.hp 
insulations, we measured degradation products in air and in nitrogen using a 
thermogravimetric analyzer (TGA) and in air using a small fire te st cell. We 
paid particular attention to corrosive gases since they can be detrimental to 
comput&r parts and high value optical equipment. Knowing the rat e at which 
should be modified or replaced by a more heat-resistant material. 
In addition to following the evolution of corrosive products during 
pyrolysis and combustion, we attempted to look at other degradation products 
that might be either highly flammable or toxic and therefore create an extra 
health hazard to fire fighters. 
Results of this study show that (1) the initial decomposition temperatures 
of wire and cable insulations are to some extent governed by the additives in 
*This work was performed under the auspices of the U. S. Department of Energy 
by Lawrence Livermore Laboratory under contract Ho. H-7405-ENG-4S. 
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their formulations; (2) at high temperatures, Teflon is the most stable of all 
four materials tested, starting to decompose at 500°C; (3) air lowers the 
initial decomposition temperature of polyethylene but not that of Teflon, PVC, 
or neoprene; (4) heating rates affect the thermal degradation rates of all 
four insulations, but are most pronounced in PVC. 
Introduction 
Before beginning our study on the thermal degradation of wire and cable 
Insulations, we conducted a literature search for .information on (1) the 
temperature range at which various insulations begin to generate corrosive 
products, (2) the rate at which they generate corrosive or flammable products, 
and (3) the effect of thermal irradiance and oxygen on the rate of product 
generation. Me found a limited amount of literature on the 
thermodecoroposition of wire and cable insulations emphasizing the generation 
of toxic products at predetermined temperatures but found nothing on initial 
decomposition of the basic polymers making up insulation materials. 
Studies involving the decomposition of low-density polyethylene £fj (more 
commonly used in insulations than high-density polyethylene) show that this 
polymer starts decomposing at 350°C in vacuum and at 395° in nitrogen. 
Some researchers believe that the gaseous environment of nitrogen might cause 
a pressure dependence on the decomposition temperature and thus be 
responsible, at least in part, for the higher temperature observed. In the 
presence of oxygen, th<? decomposition temperature decreases drastically. 
Holmstrom and Sorvik \z\ reported that polyethylene starts decomposing at 
2S4°c when it is heated at atmospheric pressure in nitrogen containing 1.16% 
oxygen. They noticed a decrease in the intrinsic viscosity of polyethylene 
samples at 284 CC and a shift toward lower molecular weights when the samples 
k-2 
are held at 355°c. They also observed a weight loss at temperatures as low 
as 315°C when the nitrogen was contaminated by 1.16% oxygen. The 
degradation products, formed through a chain scission resulting from inter-
and intramolecular hydrogen abstractions, are saturated and unsaturated 
hydrocarbons, ethers, aldehydes, and ketones having low molecular weights. 
Researchers who have studied the decomposition of PVC [3-8] report that 
its initial decomposition temperature varies between 120 and 170°C. The 
variation is a result of the purity of the poiymer and the polymerization 
technique used to prepare it. There is a general agreement among the 
researchers that when PVC is heated to 220°C In a vacuum its only volatile 
degradation product is HCL. However, when it is heated to the same 
temperature in air, dehydrochlorination as well as oxidation reactions can 
occur and initiate chain scissions. Pyrolysis of PVC between 250 and 350°C 
results in the furmation of HCL, benzene, toluene, and other hyrirocarbons|Vj. 
When PVC is preheated to 300°C for 30 min, the resulting degradation 
products are H ? ) co, saturated anrt -»msati»raterf hydrocarbons, ztyrem, 
substituted benzene, traces of ethylene chloride, and HCL [4] . 
McCormack [9] , who studied the degradation of several neoprene 
compositions, showed that essentially all of the HCL in these compositions is 
liberated from the polymer chains at temperatures between 300 and 400°C. 
HCL is not detected in degrading neoprene that contains either CaCO, or 
CaC0 3 and AI2O3 + 3H 20. The amount of CaCOj in the polymer is 
sufficiently large to react with most of the HCL potentially available from 
the neoprene compound. The initial major weight loss for neoprene compounds 
(at about 350°C) is believed to result from a loss of water rather than a 
loss of HCL, in accordance with the following reaction: 
CaC0 3 + 2HCL >CaCl 2 + H 20 + C0 2-
Studies on the pyrolysis of polytetrafluoroethylene (Teflon) fjlO-Wj show 
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that this polymer is extremely stable below 350°C but decomposes rapidly at 
temperatures above 450°C. Its degradation products vary with the 
temperature of pyrolysis and the precise molecular weight of the polymer. 
Lee [lO] and coworkers report that at 400°C Teflon loses only 0.0« of its 
weight and that its degradation products are HF and COFg. At 450°C Teflon 
loses 3.56% of its weight and the main degradation product is a particulate 
product postulated to consist of the basic fluor-carbon matrix. In addition 
to the particulate product, gaseous tetrafluoroethylene (TFE) and 
hexafluoropropylene (HFP) are produced, both of which are respiratory toxins 
Ijo], Between 500 and 550°C there is a shift in the pyrolysis products and 
octafluoroiso-butylene (OFIB), tetrafluoroethylenej hexafluoroethane (HFE), 
and hexafluoropropylene (HFP) [lOj . Of these three products, OFIB is most 
toxic, causing respiratory damage and kidney damage [ll]. Above 500°C, the 
entire degradation product is thought to be carbony1 fluoride. This compound 
may react with the glass parts of experimental equipment to produce silicon 
tetrafluoride. The toxicity of both of these compounds appears to he limited 
to the lungs [l2j. 
Experimental Approach 
The experimental approach consisted of: 
1. Thermogr'avimetr ic analysis of the various insulations in nitrogen and in 
air at heating rates of 2.5, 5, 10, 20, and *0°C/min from ambient to 
900°C. 
2. Monitoring of corrosive products during thermogravimetric measurements to 
determine the initial temperature of their generation and the effect of 
air and heating rates on their evolution. 
3. Monitoring of corrosive products at the entry of the ductwork of the small 
test cell. 
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4. Gas chromatographic/mass spectrometric analysis of the noncorrosive 
thermal degradation products. 
Experimental Procedure 
PVC, PVC-polyethylene, neoprene, and Teflon samples weighing 8-10 mg were, 
heated at a rate of 2'.5-40°C/min In dry nitrogen and dry air from ambient 
temperature to 900°C in a thermogravimetric analyzer (TGA). This particular 
TGA model has a temperature capability up to 1000°C. A multi-channel 
recorder recorded sample weight as a function of temperature and the rate of 
change in sample weight,- measured by our derivative computer. The thermal 
degradation gases produced by the samples In the TGA were directed to a SO-ml 
test tube filled with 20 ml of distilled water, buffered to pH 6.8-7.0. The 
aqueous solution was gently stirred with a magnetic stirrer to achieve uniform 
mixing. The change in pN (predominantly caused by the formation of HCL) was 
measured with a pencil-size pH-reference electrode as a function of 
temperature and recorded by the multichannel recorder, together with the 
weight loss of the sample. This simple approach gave us a visual correlation 
between weight loss, the generation of corrosive gases, and the initial 
temperature at which these gases are formed. 
Next, we measured the HCL and other combustion products generated from 
heated samples in the small test facility. The facility as shown in figure 1 
has an overall volume of 0.42 m 3(15 ft 3) and is equipped with 152 mm(6") 
diameter ventilation ducts that extend approximately 1.8 m(6') from both 
sides. Air can either be forced or drawn through the box. The principle 
parameters which can be monitored during ah experiment are: airflow, optical 
density, enclosure pressure, fuel mass loss, temperatures and flame 
radiation. Combustion products are drawn from a point near the exhaust duct. 
Figure 2 shows the location of the various sensing devices 1n and on the cell 
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Each test sample consisted of eight neoprene or PVC cable insulations held 
in place in a specially designed holder. Each cable was 45 mm(18") long and J 
had an 0.0. of 10 mm (3/8"). The gas burner was 12.7mm (1/2") diameter pipe i 
with 1.6mm(l/16") holes drilled on a 6.4mm(l/4") grid. Its output was a * 
premixed propane/air flame with an energy output of approximately 1530J/s 
(908TU/min) which gives a total 5 minute run of 459 BTU. 
During an experiment, combustion products were sampied with a vacuum pump 
and bubbled into 40 ml of distilled water buffered to pH 6.8-7.0. 
A pH-reference electrode was connected to an Orion digital meter and a 
PDP-11 computer, which also recorded temperatures, weight loss, oxygen 
depletion and temperature rise as a function of time. 
Two methods were used to determine the noncorrosive thermal degradation 
products of the plastics. One involved extracting the aqueous sample with 
cyclohexane, condensing the extract, and analyzing the solution in a gas 
chromatograph/mass spectrometer (GC/HS). The other involved heating the 
sample which weighed approximately (0.5 mg) in a pyrolyzer and allowing the 
products to enter a gas chromatographic (gc) column shortly after pyrolysis. 
Only the PVC and polyethylene samples were thermally degraded in the pyrolyzer. 
The PVC sample was first placed in the TGA and heated in N^ at 
20°C/min to 355°C to drive off most of the HCL, and then placed in the 
pyrolyzer and heated in helium at 360°C to determine what other products 
form from the dehalogenated hydrocarbon and the remaining additives 
incorporated into the plastic during the manufacturing process. Since 
polyethylene starts decomposing at 230°C in air and is widely used in . f 
combination with PVC for insulating high-voltage cables, we pyrolyzed a 
polyethylene sample at 230°C to determine the kinds of degradation products ' 
that form at the onset of pyrolysis or combustion. 
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The products from all samples were separated on a 6-ft x 1/8-in. 
stainless-steel column packed with 45! SE-30 on 100/20 supelcoport and on a 
6-ft x 1/8-in. stainless-steel column packed with 4% Carbowax 20 M on 80/100 
Chromosorb WAU. Two microliters of the solution were injected on the columns 
for each analysis-. To separate the more volatile fractions, initial column 
temperature was set at 40°c and programmed at 2°C/min to 150°C; helium 
flow rate was maintained at 20 ml/min; and the injection port, flame 
ionization detector oven, mass spec transfer line, and jet separator oven were 
set at 25Q°C. To separate the less volatile fractions, initial column 
temperature was set at 100°C at;d programmed at 5°C/min to 240°C and 
helium flow rate was maintained at 40 ml/min,the other parameters remained the 
same as in the separation of the more volatile fraction. 
Results 
Figure 3 shows the dynamic thermogravimetric weight as a function of 
temperature for the various polymers heated in nitrogen at 10°c/min< 
Cellulose is included for comparison. Ihe curves disclose the threshold 
temperatures for active pyrolysis as well as the temperature ranges at which 
the majority of the degradations occur. Teflon was the most stable 
insulation, followed by polyethylene, cellulose, PVC, and neoptene. A more 
detailed examination of the individual weight loss curves reveals certain 
differences among the insulations. 
The neoprene-based insulation shows three distinct regions of 
decomposition. The first region, an initial rapid weight loss between 180 and 
280°C, is probably caused by a loss of water from hydrated alumina, one of 
the additives frequently included in the neoprene composition. The second 









- Polyethylene A 
Teflon • 






to the loss of HCL from the polymer chain. The third region, a very gradual 
weight loss, is probably caused by the decomposition of carbonaceous residue 
in the polymer chain. 
The polyvinylchloride insulation also shows three regions of 
decomposition. The first region, the initial rapid weight loss between 260 
and 350°, is primarily the result of a loss of HCL and the degradation of a 
plasticizer usually included in the PVC preparation. The dehydrochlorination 
reaction leads to the formation of long, conjugated polyenyl structures. The 
second region, between 350 and 510°C, involves the decomposition of the 
residual cross-linked polymer chains. Finally, the'third region, a very slow 
degradation of the polymer's charlike residue, commences at 520°C. 
The initial decomposition of polyethylene between 390 and 450°C suggests 
zero-order kinetics and is probably caused by segments breaking off the ends 
of the highly branched polymers as well as decomposition of additives 
incorporated in the formulation. The next rCvjiun, between 450 and SCO^C, 
resembles first-order kinetics and is probably caused by random breaking of 
the molecular chain. 
The dynamic thermogravimetric curve for Teflon shows the exceptional 
thermal stability of the polymer. In the nitrogen environment Teflon loses 
very little weight until 500°C, and the maximum degradation rate occurs from 
approximately 580 to 650°C. The degradation of this insulation material 
appears to follow first order kinetics during the main portion of 
decomposition- It is believed that the basic polymer begins to decompose or 
"unzip" at the free radical ends of the chain, yielding mostly monomers. Once 
started, the polymer continues to unzip down the chain until the whole chain 
has decomposed. 
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Figure 4 compares the rate of change in residual weight with the rate of 
decomposition for PVC insulation heated in nitrogen at 10°C/min» The rate 
of change in weight is depicted as the percentage of weight loss per minute 
and as a function of the heating rate. Portraying the degradation of 
insulation materials in this way gave us a clear view of how the polymer might 
be affected by air or different heating rates. The graph shows that the 
highest rate of degradation is between 290 and 340°C, the range in which 
dehydrochTorination occurs, and between 440 and 500°C, the range in which 
decomposition of residual polyenyl structure occurs. 
Neoprene 
Figure 5 shows the effect of the heating rate on the degradation of 
neoprene in nitrogen. An increased heating rate has no effect on the initial 
degradation temperature, which remains at 170°C; however, it has a 
pronounced effect on the rate of defcydVocftlwinaiion in the region between 2B0 
and 350°c and on the rate of oxidation of carbonaceous residue in the region 
between 450 and 550°C. When the sample is heated at a rate of 40°C/min, 
the rate of degradation during dehydrochforfnation and oxidation of the 
residual polymer chain increases drastically, peaking at 430°C to 12%/min. 
However when the sample is heated at a rate of 20°C/min, the rate at 430°C 
is only ISJ/min. 
The effect of air on the degradation of neoprene (Fig. 6) is most 
pronounced when the sample is at the rates of 20 and 40°C/nrin. Again, the 
rate of degradation is influenced most during dehydrochlorination and 
oxidation of the carbonaceous residue in the region between 500 and 600°C. 
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Figure 7 shows that there was no change in the pH of the solution during 
decomposition of the neoprene sample heated in air at 10°C/min in the TGA. 
As mentioned previously, the HCL that evolves reacts with the CaCO, 
incorporated in the sample and therefore remains undetected by the pH meter. 
Similarly, no HCL was detected when the neoprene insulation was burned in the 
small test facility. 
In addition to HCL, we measured other combustion products from burning 
neoprene--those from residual neoprene polymer and those from additives used 
in the formulation of neoprene. The airborne products were bubbled into a 
water trap and extracted with cyclohexane before GC/MS analysis. Table 1 
lists some of these products and their probable healtn, fiaramability, and 
reactivity hazards. The hazards, assigned according to the recommendations of 
the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) [15] , are those that might be 
encountered by firemen fightirrg fires involving plastic insulation materials. 
The system used by the HFPA indentifies the hazards of a chemical in terms 
of three categories; namely "Health, Flammability, and Reactivity" and 
indicates the order of severity in each of these categories by five divisions 
ranging from "four (1)" indicating a severe hazard to "zero (0)" indicating no 
special hazard. 
The chemicais listed in Table 1 are, for the most part, decomposition 
products of residual neoprene polymer and additives used in neoprene 
formulation so most of the products are nonreactive and must be moderately 
heated in order to ignite. Phenol and o-cresol are extremely hazardous if 
they come in contact with the skin. Therefore, firefighters should wear full 
protective clothing--plus selfcontained breathing apparatus; rubber gloves; 
boots; and bands around legs, arms, and waist. 
Polyvinylcfclor ide 
Figure 8 shows the effect of heating rates on the degradation of PVC in 
nitrogen. The increased heating rates have their greatest affect on 
decotnposition rates in the dehydrochlorination range which occurs between 260 
and 3S0°C. The increased heating rates also affect the rate of 
A-16 
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Table 1. Thermal degradation products of neoprene generated in a small test 
faci l i ty. 
Degradation product NFPA Hazard Identi f icat ion 
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aChemical is extremely dangerous, but protective clothing; self-contained 
breathing apparatus; rubber gloves; boots; and bands around arms, legs, and 
waist will provide protection. 
bChemical is hazardous when inhaled, but self-contained breathing apparatus 
will protect against inhalation. 
cChemical is only slightly hazardous to firemen. 
dIn a fire condition, chemical would pose the same health hazard as an 
ordinary combustible material. 
eChemical must be moderately heated to ignite. Water may extinguish the 
fire because the chemical can be cooled below its flash point. 
fChemical must be preheated to ignite. Water may cause frothing if it gets 
below the surface of the liquid and turns to steam. A water fog gently 
applied to the surface will cause frothing that will extinguish the fire. 
9Chemical is normally stable and therefore does not present any reactivity 
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decomposition of the highly cross-linked carbonaceous chain which takes place 
in the temperature range between 350 and 510°C The higher heating rates do 
not change the initial decomposition temperatures which remains at Z50°C. 
The effect of air on the decomposition rate of PVC (Fig. 9) is most 
pronounced in the active pyrolysis region or the dehydrochlorination region. 
This is particularly evident at a heating rate of 40°C/min, which leads to a 
peak decomposition rate of 50%/min. At a heating rate of 20°C/min, the peak 
decomposition rate is only 10%/min. 
Figure 10 shows the evolution of HCL from a PVC sample heated in nitrogen 
at 100C/min. The HCL first evolves at a low rate at 195°C and then 
increases in rate between 290 and 310°C, and finally reaches a constant 
level at 370°C. 
To determine the other degradation products of PVC, i.e., those formed 
after most of the HCL has left, we heated a sample of PVC insulation in the 
jliA to &b°l and then p.yrolled its residue in neiium ni. .i'Ĉ C in a 
pyrolyzer directly connected to the inlet system ot our gas chromatograph. ws 
used helium in the pyrolyzer since it was already being used to separate the 
mixture on the gc column. 
Tne Droducts we identified (Table 2) are formed during the decomposition 
of highly cross-linked polyenyl residue. Most of the chemicals are hazardous 
when inhaled, but their inhalation can be avoided by the use of a 
self-contained breathing apparatus. Some, such as isoprene and 
cyclopentadiene, are very flammable and capable of violent chemical change at 
elevated temperature and pressure. Others, for example, benzene, toluene, 
chlorobenzene, o, m, £-xylene and styrene, are liquids that can be ignited 
under almost all normal temperature conditions. The rest of the products are 
either chemicals that must be moderately heated before they can ignite or 








• 40'C/min ~ 
o V 
10 
£ 30 — — 




S 10 — 
o . t •» / i w ^ n ^ _ 











100 200 600 
120 












Table 2. Thermal degradation products of PVC pyrolyzed in helium at 360°C 
Degradation product NFPfl Hazard Identification 
Health Fl amiability Reactivity 
1,3-butadiene 2 a 4 C 2 9 
isoprene 2 4 2 
cyclopentadiene no data 
benzene 2 3 d 0 h 
toluene 2 3 0 
chlorobenzene 2 3 0 
£,m,£-xylene 2 3 0 
styrene 2 3 2 
o-methylstyrene 2 2 e 0 
1-methylnaphthalene 2 2 0 
biphenyl 2 l f 0 
fluorene no data 
phenanthrene 1 0 
anthracene 0 1 
aChemical is hazardous when inhaled, but self-contained breathing apparatus 
will protect against inhalation. 
DIn a fire condition, chemical would pose the same health hazard as an 
ordinary combustible material. 
cChemical is a very fUmmable gas or liquid. 
dChemical can be ignited under almost all normal temperature conditions. 
Water may not extinguish the fire because of the chemical's low flash point. 
eChemical must be moderately heated tc ignite. Mater may extinguish the 
fire because the chemical can be cooled below its flash point. 
fChemical must be preheated to ignite. Water may cause frothing if it gets 
below the surface of the liquid and turns to steam. A water fog gently 
applied to the surface will cause frothing that will extinguish the fire. 
^Chemical undergoes a violent chemical change at elevated temperatures and 
pressures. 
"Chemical is ;normally stable and therefore does not present any reactivity hazard to firemen. 
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Figure 11 shows the rise in temperature in the proximity of a PVC sample 
burned in the small fire test facility and the pH of the gas stream. The 
sample was the PVC portion of the composite PVC-polyethylene cable 
insulation. The initial change in pH occurs 15 seconds after ignition, when 
the temperatures near the bottom and center of the sample are 340°C. 
Hydrochloric acid stops evolving at 100 seconds after ignition, when the 
temperature near the bottom of the sample is 400°C and the temperature near 
the center of the sample is 520°C. We feel that the discrepancy between the 
measured initial temperatures for the evolution of HCL in the small test 
facility and the TGA is partly because in the small test facility the HCL is 
measured under flaming combustion and in the TGA, the HCL is measured under 
smoldering or pyrolyzing conditions. In the small test facility the 
thermocouples measure both sample temperature and flame temperature as the 
flames move across the surface of the sample. The thermocouple in the TGA 
furnance is situated closer Lo the sample and therefore measures the increase 
in sample temperature fairly accurately, as the temperature of the furnance is 
increased in a controlled linear fashion. In the test facility the 
temperature rise on the surface of the sample is so rapid that the temperature 
during pyrolysis, preceeding flaming combustion, cannot be resolved; and thus, 
early dehydroch1 orination, which would occur at a lower temperature, for 
example, 195+5°C, remains undetected. Nevertheless, the two apparatus can 
be used successfully to estimate the initial temperatures at which HCL is 
produced during a cable shortcut and to determine the time at which HCL is 
produced after ignition of the sample. 
Table 3 lists some of the combustion products from flaming PVC 
insulation. The products were collected in water and extracted with 
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Table 3. Thermal degradation products of PVC insulation generated in a 
small test facility 
Degradation product NFPA Hazard Identification 











































aChemical is hazardous when inhaled,'but self-contained breathing apparatus 
will protect against inhalation. 
"Chemical is only sligi ightly hazardous to firemen. 
cIn a fire condition, chemical would pose the same health hazard as an 
ordinary combustible material. 
dChemical can be ignited under almost all normal temperature conditions. 
Water may not extinguish the fire because of the chemicals low flash point. 
eChemical must be moderately heated to ignite. Mater may extinguish the 
fire because the chemical can be cooled below Its flash point. 
^Chemical must be preheated to ignite. Water may cause frothing if it gets 
below the surface of the liquid and turns to steam. A water fog gently 
applied to the surface will cause frothing that will extinguish the fire. 
^Chemical is normally stable and therefore does not present any reactivity 
hazard to firemen. 
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appraisal of the products indicates that most of these compounds are probably 
formed during degradation of the residual highly cross-linked PVC polymer, 
after most of the HCL has left the polymer. It is also conceivable that some 
of them, e.g., ethylphthalate and diethylphthalate, are volatilized 
plasticizers used in the formulation of PVC. A few of the noncorrosive 
chemicals formed during combustion are hazardous when inhaled, so firemen must 
•ear self-contained breathing apparatus. Methylcyclohexane and cyclohexane 
are two examples of chemicals which can be ignited under almost all of the 
normal temperature conditions. 
Polyethylene 
Figures 12 And 13 show the effect of heating rates and air on the 
pyrolysis rate of polyethylene. As with the other insulations, the heating 
rate does not affect the ir.itial decomposition temperature (380°C in 
nitrogen and 230°C in air). Raising the heating rate from Z^C/min to 
10°C/min increases the rate of random breaking in the molecular chain 
between 435 and 480°C- Polyethylene starts decomposing considerably earlier 
in air than in nitrogen. ATI heating rates show very Tow decomposition rates 
at 230°C; however, when they are raised to 1°, 20, and 40°C/min at 380, 
375, and 360°C, respectively, the decomposition rates increase rapidly. 
Figure 13 also shows that the maximum weight loss rates largely depend on the 
heating rate of the sample. 
Table 4 lists a number of the decomposition products of polyethylene that 
form in helium at 380°C. Most of the chemicals are nonreactive but have a 
very low flashpoint and will ignite under almost all normal temperature 
conditions. A number of these compounds are dangerous when inhaled; hence a 
self-contained breathing apparatus fs required for protection against them. 
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^Chemical is hazardous when inhaled, but self-contained breathing apparatus 
will protect against inhalation, 
DChemical is only slightly hazardous. 
cIn a fire condition, chemical would pose the same health hazard as an 
ordinary combustible material, 
dChemical is a very flammable gas or liquid. 
eChemical can be ignited under almost all normal temperature conditions. 
Water may not extinguish the fire because of the chemical's low flash point. 
^Chemical must be moderately heated to ignite. Hater may extinguish the 
fire because the chemical can be cooled below its flash point. 
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Table 4 Cont. 
SCheraical must be preheated to ignite. Water may cause frothing if it gets 
below the surface of the liquid and turns to steam. A water fog gently 
applied to the surface will cause frothing that will extinguish the fire. 
"Chemical undergoes a violent chemical change at elevated temperatures and 
pressures. 
'Chemical is normally stable and therefore does not present any reactivity 
hazard to firemen. 
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Teflon 
Figures 14 and 15 show the decomposition of teflon in nitrogen ansj j n 
air. Unfortunately, at this point in our study, we experimented with only two 
heating rates in nitrogen and three heating rates in air. In nitrogen, a 
change from 2.5 to 10°C/min causes the temperature at which the maxtnim rate 
°f degradation occurs to shift from 565, to 600°C. At a heating rate of 
2-5°C/min ai> does not affect the temperature at which the maximum rate of 
degradation occurs, but it does change the rate of degradation from 7 to 
W/niin. A heating rate of 10°C/min lowers the temperature at which the 
maximum rate of weight loss occurs from 620°C to 600°C in air. The 
maximum rate of weight loss in air at a heating of 10°c/min is 299J/mii>, a s 
opposed to 20%/min in nitrogen at the same heating rate. A heating rate of 
2° t/min in air shifts the temperature at which maximum weight loss occurs 
to <J30°c. The maximum rate of degradation at this temperature is 47%/min. 
The decomposition products of Teflon were not analyzed. 
Con*:ius ions 
The primary findings of this study indicate the following: 
!• The initial decomposition temperatures ot wire and cable insulation 
materials are to some extent governed by the additives present in the 
formulations and therefore are not exactly the same as those reported in 
literature for the basic polymers. 
2. The techniques used to determine the initial temperatures at which 
corrosive products are formed can be successfully applied to pyrolysis 
studies. However, the initial temperatures at which corrosive chemicals 
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unless thermocouples are embedded in the sample or shielded from the 
flames. However, one can determine the initial time from ignition at 
which the corrosive products are first seen. 
Neoprene has the lowest decomposition temperature. We did not detect HCL 
as a degradation product because it was probably absorbed by CaCO,, an 
additive frequently included in neoprene formulations. 
PVC has the next lowest decomposition temperature, generating HCL between 
290 and 400°C. The effect of heating rates and air on the degradation 
rate of PVC is most pronounced in the dehydrochlorination region. 
With the exception of polyethylene, air does not lower the initial 
decomposition temperatures of the insulations. The initial decomposition 
of polyethylene is lowered from 400°C in nitrogen to ?30°C in air. 
Of the four insulations studied, Teflon is the most stable at high 
temperatures since it does not start decomposing until 500°C. 
NOTICL 
This rcnci; *a i f rvp^ieJ s» ap account of «oin ip ii.,.n'd b> 'hi United 
States Government. Neither the United State* nut the 1'rtiied Sulci 
Department of Enerey. not any of their employee*, not jnv of their 
ConlMCior. siibcunlraciors, ot their i-mplcyuck. make< any wamniy, 
express or implied, i>r assumes any legal lability or i-opomilijluy far (he 
accuracy, completeness u( usefulnvts of any inluiRiatton. apparatus 
product or pru&vs& difdowd, or represent* thai its. uvc would nut inttinjn.' 
privatcly-oanrd rights. 
Reference tu a eumpany or pioduel njine d«e\ not imply approval i»r 
recomnuinilauun ol the product i i , the L'niverM'ty uf'California ot the U.S. 
Department 'it Entries to the exclusion of other-, (hat may be suitable 
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